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relator do exist, they are not enforceable by mandamus. To this
we cannot agree. To our mind it is the duty of respondent to
furnish the transmitter and telephone to the relator as it does to its
other subscribers, without discrimination; that this duty arises from
the trust or station assumed by respondent, and that relator has no
adequate remedy at law. The duty is of the same nature as the
duties of common carriers. Respondent is a common carrier of
news, the same as a telegraph company. The duty of common
carriers is one of law, growing out of their office, and not of con-
tract: Redf. Carr., p. 30, § 40; Western Transp. Co. v. Newhall,
24 Ill. 466. The remedy by mandamus is the appropriate one.
The duty is of a public character, and there is no other adequate
mode of relief: Vincent v. Chicago & A. B. Co., supra; State v.
Hartford & IV. H. R. Co., 29 Conn. 588; People v. Albany &
V. B. Co., 24 N. Y. 261; 2 Shelf. Railw. 864; Moses, Mand.
155, 168, 171, 176; 2 Redf. Railw. 257, 275, 294; Chicago &
X. T. By. Co. v. People, 56 Ill. 365; State v. Bell Telephone
Co., supra.
A peremptory writ of mandamus must be allowed.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
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5
ACTION.
Conspiracy to Prevent the Collection of a Special Tax.-The plaintiff
obtained a judgment against a county and obtained a mandamus thereon
commanding the levy and collection of a special tax. In obedience to
this and other like writs the County Court levied a special "judgment
tax." Defena1ants and their confederates conspired to prevent the col-
lection of this tax, and, by assembling in great numbers and by threats
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1884. The cases will probably appear in 113 U. S. Rep.
2 From B. D. Turner, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 43 Ark. Rep.
3 From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 111 IIll. Rep.
4 From A. Al. T. Randolph, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 33 Kans. Rep.
5 From John Lathrop, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 137 Mass. Rep.
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and hostile demonstrations, prevented any bidding at an a.vertised sale
of horses and mules levied upon by the collector, and overawed and
intimidated the taxpayers of the county so that they did not pay the
tax. Rehd, on demurrer, that plaintiff had a right of action against
the defendants : Rindlay v. .MfcAllister, S. 0. UI S., Oct. Term 1884.
Foreign Adminstrator-Aetion, for Tort.-An administrator appointed
in another state cannot maintain an action in this state, where the law
of the state from whence he derives his appointment prohibits him from
instituting, maintaining or prosecuting an action in his own state for
damages resulting from the wrongful act. or omission Gf another in causing
the death of his intestate: Limekiller v. Hannibal & St. J. Railroad
Co., 33 Xas.
Kansas Pacific RailwayCo. v. Lydia H. Sutter, It Kas. 568, referred
to and distinguished; Perry, as administrator, etc., V. St. Joseph &
Western Railway Co., 29 Kas. 420, referred to and commented upon:
Id.
What constitutes Loan-Right of Aetion.-If A. borrows money for
B., the payment of whicb is secured to the lender by a transfer of stock
furnished by B., to whom the money so borrowed is paid by A., this
does not constitute a loan by A. to B., to recover which A. can main-
tain an action against B., before A. has repaid the money which he
borrowed, or has sustained some loss: Reece v. Dennett, 137 Mass.
ASSIGNMENT. See Bills and Notes.
Validity in other State.-An assignment of property, executed in
another state, by a debtor domiciled there, for the benefit of his cred-
itors, which provides that certain creditors shall be paid in full before-
the others are paid anything, and which is assented to by creditors
holding claims exceeding in amount the value of the property assigned,
if valid by the law of that state, will be upheld in this commonwealth,
as against an attaching creditor of the assignor domiciled here: Train
v. Kendall, 137 Mass.
ATTACH-MENT. See Assignment.
Residence.-" Residence," in the attachment laws generally, implies
an established abode, fixed permanently for a time, for business or other
purposes, although there may be an intent existing all the while to
return at some time to the true domicile. An actual resident in this
etate, having a domicile in another, cannot be attached here as a non-
resident: Krone v. Cooper, 43 Ark.
"Domicile is of broader meaning than residence." It includes resi-
dence: but actual residence is not indispensable to retain a domicile
after it is once acquired. It is retained by the mere intention not to
change it: Id.
ATTORNEY.
Unauthorized Release.of Judgment.-& release of a judgment was
entered upon the appearance docket by a person who signed the release
as "attorney of record," but le was not an attorney of the judgment-
creditor, and had no authority from the judgment-creditor to enter such
release, and the judgment had never been paid or satisfied. Hfeld, that
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the release was v*id : 1st. Because the person entering the release had
no authority therefbr from the judgment-creditor. And 2d. Because
an attorney at law has no power, except by special authority from his
client, to release his client's judgment where the judgment has not
been paid or satisfied: Rounsarille v. iHazen, 33 Kas.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Bill of Exchange-Payable out of Particular Fund.-A draft for a
certain sum, drawn by one person upon another, payable at sight to the
order of a bank named, and containing the direction to charge the same
to a certain account, is a negotiable bill of exchange, not payable out of
a particular fund, and does not constitute an assignment of the fund:
Whitney v. Eliot Aat. Bank, 137 Mass.
BURGLARY. See Criminal Law.
-CoM1 M N CARRIER.
Special Contract limiting £n'abihty.-A stipulation in a shipping
contract, voluntarily and understandingly entered into by a shipper of
live stock for transportation, that in consideration of a reduced rate no
claim for damages accruing to the shipper shall be allowed or paid by
the carrier, or sued for in any court, unless a claim for such loss or
damage shall be made in writing, verified by the affidavit of the shipper
or his agent, and delivered to the general freight agent of the carrier,
at his office, within five days from the time such stock is removed from
the cars, will be binding upon the shipper, and is not void as being con-
trary to any law or to public policy: Black v. Wabash, St. L. and Pac.
Railway Co., 111 Ill.
Where a party of niature years and sound mind, being able to read
and write, without any imposition or artifice to throw him off his guard,
deliberately signs a written agreement without informing himself of the
nature of its contents, he will nevertheless be bound by it, for the reason
the law will not permit him to allege, as a matter of defence, his ignor-
ance of that which it was his duty to know, particularly when the
means of information are within his immediate reach, and he neglects
to avail himself of them: id.
Negligence-Making up Train- Ownership of Cars by different Com-
panies.-If a railhay company receives a passenger in one of its cars for
passage before making up the train of which such car is to be a part,
the law requires the company to make up its train, couple, manage and
control its cars and engines, in such a careful, skilful and prudent
manner as to carry the passenger with reasonable safety, and it will be
liable for an injury to the passenger resulting from its neglect of this
duty, when such passenger is not wanting in ordinary care : lannibal
and St. J. Railroad Co v. Martin, 111 Il1.
Where a passenger in a railway coach which was overcrowded, was
informed, by the announcement of the conductor in charge, that another
car had been added in front, and the adding of the car had been felt
when it was pushed back, and it was found in proper position for the
reception of passengers, though in fact not securely coupled, so that
just as such passenger was in the act of stepping from the platform of
the rear coach to the forward one, the latter moved forward suddenly,
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causing him to fall to the ground, whereby he received a serious injury,
it Was held, that the passenger had the right to assume he could pass
from the one ear to the other with safety, and in so attempting was not
chargeable with want of ordinary care: If.
Where the trains of a railway corporation are made up by the em-
ployees of another railroad company, and on the track of the latter, and
cars used to make up the same belong to other companies, if the use of
the cars and -tracks and labor in making up such trains is to enable such
first-named corporation to exercise its function and perform its duty as
common carrier, such cars, tracks and servants, so far as the rights of
its passengers who may receive an injury are concerned, must be
regarded as the'cars, tracks and servants of the company so using the
same: Id.
Ralroads-Limited Tickets- Obligations of Purchaser and Carrier
-Contin uous Journey--7Ejectiun of Passenger-Damages.-A passenger
on a limited railroad ticket is bound to use it within the time specified
in the ticket, and to observe the reasonable regulations of the carrier
for the running of trains and for facilitating the business of the carriage
of passengers; and the company is bound to afford him the opportunity
to do so, by running its trains within the time; and if in this it fail,
though the last day be a Sunday, it cannot refuse the ticket afterwards,
at least when offered on the first train after the expiration of the time.
L. R. and F. S. Railway v. Dean, 43 Ark.
I A purchaser of a limited ticket over several connecting lines of rail-
roads is not bound to make a continuous journey over all, but is bound
to make it continuous over each coupon of the ticket; and over the last
within the time limited: Id.
A limited railroad ticket over several connecting lines expired on
Sunday; the last line ran no train on that day, and the passenger
offered the ticket on the train the next day. It was refused, and the
passenger, under protest and under threat of ejection by the conductor,
paid his fare to a further station, and there, for want of money, was put
off, and walked to his destination. Hield, that the extra fare paid, the
humiliation of being put off the train, and the inconvenience of reaching
his destination by walking, were proper elements of damage to be con-
sidered by the jury : Id.
Ejection of Passenger-Liability of Comany.-If the ticket seller
of a railroad corporation delivers to a passenger a ticket with a hole
punched in it, and assures him that the ticket entitles him to be carried
to his place of destination, when in fact, by the rules of the corporation,
it does not, and the passenger is expelled by the conductor from the train
of cars, for refusing to pay additional fare, lie may maintain an action
therefor against the corporation : Murdock v. Boston & Albany Railroad
Co., 137 Mass.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See Action; Assignment.
CONSPIRACY. See Action.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Regulation of Commerce-Navigable Waters-Power of a State over.
-The commercial power of Congress is exclusive of state authority only
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when the subjects upon which it is exerted are national in character:
when they are local in their nature or operation, or constitute mere aids
to commerce, the states may provide for their regulation and manage-
inent until Congress intervenes and supersedes their action : Cardwell
v. American Bridge Co., S. (. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
The clause in the act of September 9, 1850, admitting California as a
state into the Union, which declares "that all the navigable waters
within the said state shall be common highways and forever free, as well
to the inhabitants of said state as to the citizens of the United States,
without any tax, impost or duty therefor," does not lessen the power over
such navigable waters which the state would have if the clause had no
existence; notwithstanding it, the state can authorize the construction
of bridges over navigable streams whenever they would promote the con-
venience of the public: Id.
Escanaba Co. v. (hicago, 107 U. S. 678, commented on: id.
Eninent Domain- What is not a Public se.-The general grant of
legislative power in the constitution of a state does not authorize the
legislature, in the exercise either of the right of eminent domain or of
the right of taxation, to take private property without the owner's con-
sent, for any but a public object; as by authorizing a city to issue its
bonds by way of donation to a private manufacturing corporation : Cole
v. La Grange, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
Deprivation of Property without due Process of Law-Eminent
Domain-General Mill Act.-A statute of a state, authorizing any per-
son to erect and maintain on his own land a water-mill and mill-dam
upon and across any stream not navigable, paying to the owners of lands
overflowed, damages assessed in a judicial proceeding, does not deprive
them of their property without due process of law, in violation of the
fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States H Bead v.
Amoskeag Manufacturing Co., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
Whether the erection and maintenance of mills for manufacturing
purposes under such a statute.can be upheld as a taking, by delegation,
of the right of eminent domain, of private property for public use, not
decided; but, held, that such a statute, considered as regulating the
manner in which the rights of proprietors of lands adjacent to a stream
may be asserted and enjoyed, with a due regard to the interests of all,
and to the public good, is within the constitutional power of the legisla-
ture : Id.
Act not Embracing more than one Su~ject.-An act of the legislature
of Iowa, entitled "an act to authorize independent school-districts to
borrow money and issue bonds therefor, for the purpose of erecting and
completing school-houses; legalizing bonds heretofore issued, and making
school-orders draw six per cent. interest in certain cases," is not in vio-
lation of the provision in the constitution of that state which declares
that "every act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly con-
nected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title :" Ack.
ley School District v. Hall, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
Liquor- Traffic is controlled 1.y the Legislature.-In the absence of
constitutional restraints, the regulation of the traffic in liquors is wholly
within legislative control. The legislature may entirely prohibit it, or
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empower municipal corporations to do so within their limits. But
neither counties, cities nor towns can impose a tax upon the privilege
not authorized by the legislature: Drew County v. Bennett, 43 Ark.
Healing Acts- Change of Lawlpending Suit.-The legislature has power
to-pass healing acts which do not impair the obligation of contracts nor
interfere with vested rights: Green v. Abraham, 43 Ark. "
The rule in regard to healing acts is this: if the thing omitted or
failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect in the proceedings,
is somethin gwhich the legislature might have dispensed with by a pre-
vious statute, it may do so by a subsequent one. And if the irregu-
larity consists in doing some act, or in the mode or manner of doing it,
which the legislature might have made immaterial by.a prior law, it may
do so by a subsequent one ; Id.
The bringing of a suit vests in a party no right to a particular
decision. His case must be determined on the law as it stands at the
time of the judgment-not at the bringing of the suit; and if pending
an appeal the law is changed, the appellate court must determine the
case under the law in force at the time of its decision : Id.
Special Legislation--Municipal Corporations-Exemption from Costs.
-An act allowing municipal corporations to appeal without giving an
appeal bond, asin other cases, is not unconstitutional, as being either a
local law or special legislation: Holmis v. .Mattoon, 111 Ill.
Public municipalities, such as counties, cities, villages, towns and
seho6l districts, and all officers suing for or defending the rights of the
state, or acting for or instead of the state in respect of public rights,
being only instrumentalities of the state, may constitutionally be autho.
rized to sue without the payment of costs, or conforming to all the
requirements imposed by the law upon natural persons or corporations
formed for private gain: Id.
CORPORATION. See Receiver.
Expulsion-By-Law-Special Meeting.-A by-law of a religious
society provided as follows: "Any member who shall either cease to
regularly worship with the society, or who shall fail to contribute to the
support of its public worship for the term of one year, shall have his or
her name dropped from the list of members." Held, that a member
could be deprived of his membership only by a vote of the society, after
a hearing: Gray v. Christian Society, 137 Mass.
A by-law of a religious society provided that the object for which a
special meeting was called must be stated. Another by-law provided
that a new member must be approved by a vote of the society. The
warrant which called a special meeting of the society, at which several
persons were admitted to membership and allowed to vote, contained no
article for the admission of new members, but c6ntained the general
article, "To transact any other business that may legally come before
said meeting." Held, that the election of such persons was invalid: id.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Evidence-Accomplice.-The confession of a prisoner accompanied
with proof that the offence was actually committed by some one, will
warrant his conviction : Melton v. State, 43 Ark.
VOL. XXXIII.-35
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A defendant cannot be convicted of a crime upon the testimony of a
partaker in the crime, whether his guilt be in the same degree or not,
unless corroborated by evidence tending to connect the defendant with
the commission of the offence ; the corroboration is not sufficient if it
merely prove the .oqyus delicti and the circumstances thereof; and one
accomplice cannot corroborate the testimony of another: Id.
Reversal of Judgment- Verdict against the Evidence.-This court will
reverse a judgment of conviction, in a case of felony, where the evidence
on which it is based is all circumstantial and of an unsatisfactory char-
acter, and which, when all considered, leaves a serious and grave doubt
of the guilt of the defendant: Mooney v. People, Ill Ill.
While this court recognises the rule that jurors are judges of the
facts and the weight of evidence in all criminal cases, yet the law has
imposed upon the court the solemn and responsible duty to see that no
injustice has been done by hasty action, passion or prejudice, or from
any other cause, on the part of the jury: Id.
Burglary- What constitutes Breaking.-The lifting of a latch of a
closed door, and the pushing open of the door, with the intent expressed
in the statute, is a sufficient breaking within the meaning of the law, to
constitute burglary : State of.Kansas v. Groning, 33 Kas.
Where a defendant was charged with burglary, under see. 68 of the
crimes act, and it was shown upon the trial that the outside door of
the building or granary, which it was alleged the defendant broke and
entered in the night time, was closed and latched a few hours before the
crime was committed, and the next morning was found open, and certain
oats and rye taken. Held, that the jury was justified in finding, upon this
evidence, that there was an actual breaking and entry into the build-
ing, within the meaning of the law , Id.
In Jeopardy-Discharge of Juror.-A prisoner is in jeopardy from
the time that the jury is impanelled and sworn in a court of competent
juisdiction upon an indictment pufficient in form and substance to sustain
a conviction ; and the entry of a nolle prosegui, or discharge of a juror,
after that, without his consent, operates as an acquittal, except in cases
of overruling necessity, as the death or illness of the judge or a juror,
or inability of the jury to agree on a verdict : Whitmore v. State, 43
Ark.
DAMAGES. See Common Carrier.
DIvoRCE. See Busband and Wife.
ERRORS AND APPEALS. See Criminal Law.
Evidence-Res Gest.-In prosecutions for assault words uttered dur-
ing the contipuance of the main transaction or so soon thereafter as to
preclude the hypothesis of concoction or premeditation, whether by the
active or passive party, become a part of the transaction itself and if
they are relevant may be proved as any other fact, without calling the
party who uttered them: Flynn v. State, 43 Ark.
ESCAPE.
Voluntary Escape- Whether a Discharge from lmprisonment.-The
ancient rule that a debtor in execution, by a voluntary escape became
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discharged both from imprisonment and the debt, leaving the creditor
to look to the sheriff alone for his debt, is no longer in force, and upon
such escape he may be lawfully re-arrested and imprisoned: The People
v. Blanchett, 111 Ill.
Where a debtor has been legally arrested by a sheriff under a ca. sa.
running in the name of the people, and is enlarged on bond for his ap-
pearauce on the day set for the hearing of his application for a discharge,
the court, on refusing a discharge, may order him back into the officer's
custody without process in the name of the people, and this may be ver-
bally done: JR.
EVIDENCE. See Crminal Law.
EXECUTORS AND ADMNISTRATORS. See Action.
EXECUTION.
Exemption- Time-Assignment without Claim-Mortgaged Property.
-A merchant tailor, who is the head of a family and a resident of the
state, is entitled to an exemption of such portion of his stock in trade
as he may select up to the statutory limit of value; and this right is
absolute, and does not depend upon any claim or selection to be made
by him: Rice v. Nolan, 33 Kas.
The mere failure of the debtor to claim his exemption until the morn-
ing preceding a sale made by an officer upon an order of attachment does
not operate as a waiver of such right: Id.
Where the stock in trade of a debtor, some of which is exempt, is
mortgaged, he cannot be compelled to accept as his exemption that
which is subject to the mortgage at its full value, but he is entitled to
an exemption of his own selection, free of all liability from debt, up to the
full value of $400: d.
Where the exempt property of the defendant has been levied on by
attachment, and a'few days before the sale thereof the defendant makes
an assignment for the benefit of his creditors, with no reservation of the
exempt property so levied on, but no other or further proceedings are
taken under such assignment, and where the plaintiffs do not claim
the property thereunder and are not influenced or prejudiced thereby, the
defendant is not estopped as against such plaintiffs from thereafter claim..
ing the attached property as exempt from sale under such attachment
process : Id.
EXEMPTION. See Execution.
FRAUD.
Fraudulent Representations- Who may sue for.-It is not necessary
to support an action .for false representation, that the representation be
addressed directly to the plaintiff. If it be made with the intent to
influence every person to whom it may be communiicated, or who may
read or hear of it, it is sufficient. Nor is it essential to the right of
action that the misrepresentation be the sole inducement to a purchase:
Carvill v. Jacks, 4 Ark.
Negligence in Signing a Contract without Reading it.-In an action
upon a written contract, which the defendant sought to avoid on the
ground of an alleged fraudulent statement that it was a copy of an
original draft except in a matter which did not concern him, the court,
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at the instance'of the plaintiff, instructed the jury that a party executing
a written contract should exercise reasonable care and prudence to learn
its nature and contents before signing it, by reading the same, if capable
of reading, and that he would not be excused for his want of care and
prudence in signing without so reading the same, unless induced to do
so by wilfully false statements of' the party procuring his signature:
Beld, that the use of the word "wilfully," in the connection it was
employed, did not render the instruction erroneous: Linington v. Strong,
111 Ill.
What is negligence in signing a contract without reading the same, is
not a question of law, but one of fact for the jury, to be judged of from
the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. In such a case it is
not proper to select certain of the facts, and tell the jury in an instruc-
tion that they afford no evidence of negligence or a want of proper and
reasonable care: ]d.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Divorce-Ecxtreme Cruelty.-Any unjustifiable conduct on the part
of the husband which so grievously wounds the mental feelings of the
wife, or so utterly destroys her peace of mind as to seriously impair her
bodily health or endanger her life, or such as utterly destroys the legiti-
mate ends and objects of matrimony, constitutes extreme cruelty,
although no physical or personal violence is inflicted or even threatened:
Avery v. Avery, 33 Kas.
INTEREST. See Usury.
INTOXICATING LIQUOR. See Constitutional Law.
LIEN. See Shipping.
MANDAMUS.
Railroad Company Construction of Brige.-Where a duty rests
upon a railroad company to construct a viaduct over its railroad tracks
where the same cross a public street in a city, mandamus will ordinarily
lie to compel the railroad company to so construct such viaduct: State
v. Mo. Pac. Railroad Co., 33 Kas.
And the action may in some cases be prosecuted in the name of the
state by the county attorney: Id.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Liability of Master for Injury to Servant caused by Defective Mate-
rials.-In an action by a workman against his employer, for personal
injuries caused by the fIl of a staging upon which he was at work, it was
in dispute whether the defendant undertook to furnish the staging as a
completed ivhole, or whether he undertook merely to provide, and did
provide, a quantity of staging materials from which fellow servants of the
workman erected the staging. The judge instructed the jury that a
master is liable to his servant for injuries resulting from defective
materials negligently furnished by him, although the negligence of a
fellow-servant contributes to the accident; and, on the question whether
the obligation of the master extended to the furnishing of the staging
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as a completed structure, read the instructions requested by each party.
and instructed the jury, that, if the plaintiff's theory was correct, the
instructions he asked for were law ; and that, if the defendant's theory
was correct, the instructions he asked for were law. Held, that the
plaintiff had no ground of exception : Clark v. Soule, 137 Mass.
Who are Fellow-Servants.-A person in the employ of a railway cor-
poration as a head blacksmith, was with a number of other employees,
directed to proceed on a wrecking train of the company to a place where
a train of cars had been wrecked, for the purpose of assisting in remov-
ing the rubbish and obstructions. The train carrying them was under
the charge of the engineer, who acted also as conductor, and by his neg-
lect to obey instructions the train collided with another, resulting in the
death of the blacksmith. Beld, that the blacksmith, and all the other
employees on the train, including the engineer and fireman, were fellow-
servants of a common master, engaged in the same line of employment,
within the rule excluding a right of recovery by one servant for the
negligence of a fellow-servant: Abend v. Terre Haute & Indianapolis
Railroad Co., 11 Ill.
IYjury to Employee- Defective Machinery.-A railroad corporation is
liable to one of its employees for an injury occasioned to him by being
struck by a bridge-guard, if the guard is out of its proper position, and
this is caused by the wearing out of the rope attached to the guard, and
the corporation has not made suitable provision to have notice of, and to
remedy, defects liable to be occasioned by its use: Warden v. Old
Colony R. R., 137 Mass.
MrUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See Constitutional Law; Taxation.
Bond of, when a Negotiable Security-Right of Holder to Sue in United
States Courts.-A municipal bond issued under the authority of law
for the payment, at all events, to a named person or order, a fixed sum
of money at a designated time therein limited, being endorsed in blank,
is a negotiable security within the law-merchant: Ackley School Dis-
trict v. Hall, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
Its negotiability is not affected by a provision of the statute, under
which it was issued that it should be "payable at the pleasure of the
district at any time before due :" Id.
Consistently with the act of March 3, 1875, determining the juris-
diction of the circuit courts of the United States, the holder may sue
therein without reference to the citizenship of any prior holder, and
unaffected by the circumstance that the municipality may be entitled
to make a defence based upon equities between the original parties : Id.
NEGLIGENCE. See Common Carrier; Fraud; Master and Servant.
(ontribufory Negligenie- What constitutes.-Where an employee of
a railroad company was sent on a wrecking train to assist in removing
the debris of a wrecked train from the track, and instead of taking his
seat in the car, in violation of a published rule of long standing entered
the locomotive and took a seat with the fireman, just in front of the
latter, where he remained until a collision took place with a freight train,
and he was killed, it was held, that he was guilty of such negligence in
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taking an extra-hazardous place, as to bar any right of action by his
persunal representative, notwithstanding the negligence of the servant in
charge of the train : Abend v. Terre Haute and Indianapolis Railroad
Co., III Ill.
It is not true, as a general proposition, that in actions for personal
injuries caused by the defendant's negligence, the contributory negli-
gence of the injured party will constitute no defence except when the
latter's negligence is an element or factor in producing the force causing
the injury complained of. It is sufficient if his negligence materially
contributes to the injury, whether it contributes to the force causing
the injury or not : Id.
A person who voluntarily and unnecessarily places himself in a well-
known place of danger to life or body, but for which position he could
not, have been injured, and he is injured or killed in consequence of such
exposure, even through gross negligence of the defendant, if the act of
the latter is not wanton or wilful, is guilty of such contributory negli-
gence as to preclude any recovery by him or his personal representa-
tive: I1.
PATENT.
What corstitutes Invention.-Novelty and increased utility do not
necessarily con-titute invention: ifollister v. Benedict Manufacturing
Company, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
That which is but the display of the expected skill of the maker's
calling, and involves only the exercise of the ordinary faculties of rea-
soning upon the materials supplied by a special knowledge, and the
facility of manipulation which results from its habitual and intelligent
practice, is in no sense a creative work of that inventive faculty which
it is the purpose of the constitution and the patent laws to encourage
and reward: Id.
Expiration of Patent during Pendency of Suit-Practice.-Suits in
equity having been begun, in "1879, for the infringement of two patents,
and the Circuit Court having dismissed the bills, the Supreme Court of
the United States, in reversing the decrees, after the first patent had
expired, but not the second, awarded accounts of profits and damages
as to both patents, and a perpetual injunction as to the second patent:
Consolidated Valve Co. v. Crosby Valve Co., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term
1884.
RAILROAD. See Common Carrier
RECEIVER.
Of Cojoration-May be appointid before Court acquires Jurisdic-
tion over Cdrporation-Real Estate.-The court mayon a proper show-
ing, appoint a receiver to take charge of the assets of an insolvent
corporation, to save the same from destruction or waste, before acquiring
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the rights of such corporation. In such
case the receiver may be authorized to hold the property until the rights
of the parties are determined. Placing property in the hands of a
receiver is in the nature of an equitable attachment, whereby the cour,
through its officer, acquires the custody of such property: St. Louis
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and Sandoval Coal and Mining Co. v. The Sandoval Coal and M3ining
Co., 111 Ill.
In the absence of any statutory provisions on the subject, real estate
cannot be vested in the receiver, except by a conveyance to him : Id.
REmiOVAL OF CAUSES.
Proceeding against an Administrator-Removals on the Ground of
Prejudice or Local Influence.-A proceeding in a state court against an
administrator, to obtain payment of a debt due by the decedent in his
lifetime, is removable into a court of the United States when the cred-
itor and the administrator are citizens of different states, notwithstanding
the state statute may enact that such claims can only be established in
a probate court of the state, or by appeal from that court to some other
state court: Hess v. Reynolds, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
The act of March 3, 1875, to determine the jurisdiction of the circuit
courts, and regulate the removal of causes from state courts, does not
repeal or supersede all other statutes on those subjects, but only such as
are in conflict with the latter statute. The third clause of section 639
of the Revised Statutes (authorizing removals on the ground of preju-
dice or local influence), is not therefore abrogated or repealed: Id.
An application for removal under that clause is in time, if made
before the trial or final hearing of the cause in the state court: Id.
SHIPPING.
Lienfor Construction.-If the hull and spars of a vessel are completed
at one port, and sufficient rigging is put on her, and a sufficient cargo
for the necessary ballast is taken, to enable her to go to another port,
where materials necessary to the rigging and equipment of a vessel, and
the first put upon her, are procured, the materials so furnished at the
latter port are furnished in the " construction" of the vessel: McDonald
v. Te Nimbus, 137 Mass.
STATUTE. See Constitutional Law.
TAXATION.
Construction of Sewer-Assessment-Notice- What Property liable.-
Where sewers are constructed under authority of a city, and afterwards
special taxes are levied upon the adjacent property owners to pay for
the same, only those individuals who can use such sewers should be taxed
specially to pay for their construction or maintenance, and each should
be taxed specially only for the amount of the special benefits which the
sewers might confer upon him, and each should be taxed specially pre-
cisely in proportion to the benefits which he might individually receive:
G-ilmore v. Hentig, 33 Kas.
Also in such cases, before special taxes can be made a fixed and per-
manent charge upon the property of such individuals they must have
notice, with an opportunity to be heard, and an opportunity to contest
the validity and fairness of such taxes : Id.
It is not necessary, however, in any case that the notice should be
personally served upon the property owner, or that the proceeding should
be a judicial proceeding, or that the notice should be given before the
taxes are levied; but any notice that will enable the property owner to
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procure a hearing before some officer, board or tribunal, and to contest
the validity and fairness of the taxes assessed against him, before the
same shall become a fixed and established charge upon his property, will
be sufficient: Id.
TRESPASS.
License from LNfe-tenant-Entry under License of Tenant for Life.-
The entry upon premises by a railway company, and the construction of a
railroad over the same, which is no injury to the inheritance, under the
verbal license of the tenant for life, is not a trespass or an unlawful
entry. Such entry will not subjept the party so entering to either an
action of trespass or ejectment on the part of the remainder-man: The
Chicago and Alton Railroad Co. v. Goodwln, 111 Ill.
TRIAL.
Sealed Verdict-Not final until recorded.-The determination of a
jury, although formally stated in a verdict, and signed and sealed, is not
final, but remains within the control of the juryand is subject to any
alteration or amendment by the jurors until it is actually rendered in
court and recorded, and up to that time any member of the jury is at
liberty to withdraw his consent from a verdict previously agreed upon
Bishop v. Mugler, 33 Kas.
A sealed verdict should be presented by the full jury in open court,
so that the parties may avail themselves of the right of polling the jury,
and until the verdict is regularly received and filed it is without force or
validity: Id.
UNITED STATES COURTS. See Micipal Corporation.
USURY.
Who may avail of the Defence.-A party not injuriously affected by
an usurious transaction, is not allowed to complain or take advantage of
the usury. So if a party sells land subject to a mortgage thereon, which
is given to secure a debt, with usury reserved, and the purchaser assumes
the payment of the debt as a part of the purchase-money, such purchaser
or those claiming under him, cannot interpose the defence of usury to a
bill to foreclose the mortgage : Stiger v. Bent, 111 Ill.
VERDICT. See Trial.
WILL.
Construction-BHeirs.-A testator, after giving several legacies by his
will, directed that the residue of his property should "be equally divided
among my brothers and sisters and their heirs." When the will was
made, and at.the testator's death, there were living tnree brothers, one
sister, and children and grandchildren of two deceased sisters. The
testator knew of the decease of his two sisters, and of the existence of
their issue. Held, that the testator intended that the heirs of his de-
ceased sisters should take, by right of representation, equally with his
surviving brothers and sister: Huntress v. Place, 137 Mass.
